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An Economic and Legal Analysis of
Physical Tie-Ins
Several recent antitrust suits have included claims that physical tie-
ins,' a particular form of innovation, have violated the antitrust laws. -2
These physical tie-in cases, involving the simultaneous marketing of
two or more new, physically compatible, complementary products, have
all presented similar fact patterns. The defendant manufacturer pos-
sessed substantial market power in a primary goods market, and faced
competition in a second market for parts, accessories, or other goods
physically complementary to the primary product. The defendant in-
troduced a new primary product for which it produced the only
physically compatible complementary products. As with any new
product introduction, the defendant achieved a temporary monopoly
in this new primary product. Because competitors' products in the
secondary market were physically incompatible with the new primary
product, the defendant also temporarily increased its market power in
the secondary market.3
The plaintiffs, who in all cases were competitors in the secondary
market, attacked these physical tie-ins on one or both of two grounds.
They first contended that the physical tie-in constituted a tying arrange-
ment violative of Section 1 of the Sherman Act 4 and Section 3 of the
1. The term "physical tie-in" seems to have appeared first in Comment, Physical Tie-
Ins as Antitrust Violations, 1975 Ill. L.F. 224. The choice of the term "physical tie-in" is
unfortunate because it suggests an inaccurate analogy to traditional tying arrangements.
See p. 773 & note 89 infra (distinguishing physical tie-ins from traditional tying ar-
rangements). Nevertheless, because the term has achieved considerable acceptance, it will
be used throughout this Note to refer to introductions of physically compatible, comple-
mentary products.
2. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd
and remanded, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3517 (U.S. Feb. 19,
1980) (Nos. 79-427, 79-499); California Computer Prods. v. IBM Corp., [1979-I] Trade
Cases (CCH) , 62,713 (9th Cir. 1979); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., [1979-2]
Trade Cases (CCH) 62,989 (N.D. Cal. 1979); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM
Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Bell & Howell v. Eastman Kodak Co., Civil No.
73-35 (N.D. III., filed July 8, 1974), reported in 595 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
A-4 (1973) & 674 ANTITRUST & TRADE REo. REP. (BNA) A-9 (1974) (settled); Telex Corp.
v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975); Argus Photo Co. v. Eastman Kodak Co., Civil No. 79-4525
(S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 27, 1979); Warner Lambert Co. v. Gillette Co., Civil No. 79-1734
(D.N.J., filed June 13, 1979); GAF Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 73 Civ. 1893 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed April 30, 1973); United States v. IBM Corp., No. 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y., filed Jan. 17,
1969).
3. It is not necessary that the secondary product be new. If the secondary product is
not new, then although the innovator is unlikely to obtain a monopoly in that segment
of the secondary market, his share of that market nevertheless should increase temporarily.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
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Clayton Act.5 Alternatively, they argued that the defendant had violated
Section 2 of the Sherman Act6 by using the physical tie-in to transfer
monopoly power from the primary to the secondary market.7
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.8 is the most important
physical tie-in case to date.9 For the first time, a physical tie-in-Kodak's
110 camera system-was found by a jury to violate Section 2 of the
Sherman Act. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the holdings concerning the physical tie-ins and remanded
several of the claims for retrial. The economic reasoning underlying the
decision is obscure, however, and the opinion fails to offer clear guid-
ance as to when a physical tie-in violates the antitrust laws.
An economic and legal analysis of complementary-product introduc-
tions is needed because there is a significant danger that incorrect
judicial analysis not only would produce incorrect decisions but also
would adversely affect innovation.' 0 Moreover, neither courts nor
economists have yet developed an analysis that captures the essential
features of the innovation process in general" and the effects of physical
tie-ins on market structure in particular.
This Note presents such an analysis, and demonstrates that although
physical tie-ins may yield significant social benefits, they also may be
used for predatory purposes." The Note argues that because of their
potential for predatory abuse, physical tie-ins should be tested under
5. Id. § 14. The three cases in which these claims have been raised are: Response of
Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976) (alleging only § I
violation); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975) (alleging violation of
both statutes); Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 272 F. Supp. 744 (D. Mass.
1967), aff'd, 390 F.2d 113 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 914 (1968) (alleging violation of
both statutes).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
7. See note 2 suPra (citing cases).
8. 457 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (opinion on defendant's motion for judgment
n.o.v. and plaintiff's application for equitable relief), rev'd and remanded, 603 F.2d 263
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3517 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (Nos. 79-427, 79-499).
9. The district court opinion is discussed in Comment, Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co.: The Predisclosure Requirement-A New Remedy for Predatory Marketing of
Product Innovations, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 395 (1979). The opinion of the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals is discussed in Comment, Antitrust Scrutiny of Monopolists' Innovations:
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 93 HARV. L. REV. 408 (1979).
10. See p. 785 infra.
11. See Nelson & Winter, In Search of [a] Useful Theory of Innovation, 6 RESEARCH
PoL'y 37, 41 (1977) [hereinafter cited as In Search]; Nelson & Winter, Neoclassical vs.
Evolutionary Theories of Economic Growth: Critique and Prospectus, 84 ECON. J. 886, 886-
90 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Critique and Prospectus].
12. A predatory purpose or intent, as ordinarily used, connotes an intent to drive
existing competitors out of business, or to discourage the entry of new competitors, or
both, by unfair means. See R. BORK, THE ANTrITRUST PARADOX 144 (1978); cf. Joskow &
Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 213, 219-20 (1979)
(defining predatory pricing).
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Section 2 of the Sherman Act, according to certain rule of reason guide-
lines derived from the economic analysis presented in this Note. To
demonstrate the legal and economic analysis developed here, the frame-
work that is derived is used to analyze the Berkey Photo opinion.
I. Economic Analysis of Physical Tie-Ins
Because of the dynamic disequilibrium nature of the innovation
process 13 and of the intertemporal strategic considerations underlying
predatory behavior,14 the most fruitful approach to analyzing the wel-
fare effects of physical tie-ins is to employ the dynamic theories of in-
novation developed by Joseph Schumpeter.' 5 These theories can be
integrated with traditional welfare economics theory to weigh the costs
and benefits of physical tie-ins in terms of social welfare.' First, how-
ever, a physical tie-in must be clearly defined.
A. Physical Tie-In Defined
The term "physical tie-in" describes a new product system consisting
of two or more new complementary goods' 7 that are physically com-
13. See pp. 775-77 infra.
14. See p. 779 infra.
15. 1 J. SCHUMPETER, BUSINESS CYCLES 72-189 (1939) [hereinafter cited as BUSINESS
CYCLES]; J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 72-106 (3d ed. 1950) [here-
inafter cited as CAPITALISM]; J. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 65-
94, 128-56 (1934) [hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT]. See generally Nelson &
Winter, Forces Generating and Limiting Concentration under Schumpeterian Competition,
9 BELL J. ECON. 524 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Schumpeterian Competition] (Schumpeterian
theory can best explain competition and innovation); Nelson & Winter, The Schumpeterian
Trade-Off Revisited (unpublished paper, Yale Univ. Economics Dept., April 1979) (ex-
amining Schumpeter's theory of innovation) [hereinafter cited as Schumpeterian Trade-
Off].
16. Social welfare ordinarily is defined, for purposes of partial equilibrium analysis,
as the sum of producers' and consumers' surplus. Producers' surplus essentially is the
difference between producers' revenues and their costs, while consumers' surplus is the
difference between what consumers would be willing to pay for a particular quantity of
a good and what they in fact have to pay for that same quantity. See W. BAUMOL,
ECONOMIC THEORY AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 497-500 (4th ed. 1977); 1 A. MARSHALL,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 124, 499, 810 n.2, 830-31 (9th ed. 1961). This concept of "social
welfare" also has been termed "consumer welfare," see, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 12, at
107-09; this latter characterization is rejected here, as it might suggest an exclusive con-
cern with consumers' surplus.
As applied in antitrust analysis, the concept of social welfare is used in evaluating
tradeoffs between productive efficiency and trade restriction. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra
note 12, at 107-15 (examining monopolies); Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust De-
fense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AMER. ECON. REV. 18 (1968) (analyzing mergers). A
similar approach is adopted here, with the modifications that various dynamic factors
also are taken into account, and that the focus of analysis is on the maximization of
longrun rather than shortrun social welfare.
17. Complementary goods are goods that consumers desire or are required to use
together, such as coffee and cream, peanut butter and jelly, or a camera and film. See W.
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patible with each other but physically incompatible, at least tempo-
rarily, with other existing goods. For clarity of exposition it is con-
venient to distinguish between primary and secondary markets and
primary and secondary goods.'8 For purposes of this Note, the "second-
ary market" is the one in which the physical tie-in allegedly has in-
jured competition. In general, this market will include one of the two
tied products just introduced and existing products that compete with
the new secondary good. The "primary market" contains the other half
of the new product pair and any other products that substitute for or
compete with the primary good. 19
Physical tie-ins must be distinguished from traditional tying ar-
rangements or tie-ins, for they differ in three important respects. First,
NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 82-83 (1972). It
actually is necessary for only one of the two complementary goods to be new, though in
most cases both will be.
18. The following analysis focuses on the simple case of a physical tie-in involving
only two new products, though it can be extended easily to systems introductions involving
more than two products.
19. The denomination of primary and secondary markets may appear confusing and
arbitrary in particular cases, since exclusionary effects may occur in both markets. In
addition, the definitions ignore the possibility that one of the goods may be desired and
that the second is purchased merely as an accessory. Cases may arise in which the new
product pair is so innovative that there are no existing products that are close substitutes.
In such cases, the primary and secondary markets would be limited to those two single
goods. An example might be the introduction of the first computer and its associated
peripheral devices, such as memories, control units, and printers. In such situations it
becomes difficult, if not impossible, to speak of competitive harm in the secondary mar-
ket, since by definition there is only one initial competitor within the market.
Finally, the characteristics of the product pair or product system introduction may vary
in ways that can influence their exclusionary impact. For example, some product pairs,
such as a computer system, may involve a once-and-for-all or at least long-term invest-
ment, with the result that an initial purchase of both goods from the innovator means
that the buyer is unlikely to buy from competitors in the near future. Other product
pairs may require continuing purchases of at least one of the products.
Examples may clarify the terminology. In the late 1960s, IBM introduced a new
generation of computers, the "370 line," which consisted of both new central processing
units (CPU's) and new related peripheral devices, such as memories, control units and
printers. Various competing manufacturers of peripheral equipment brought suit alleging
that these new CPU's, which were incompatible with their competing products, combined
with IBM's dominance in the CPU market to injure competition in the market for
peripheral devices, the secondary market, and to increase IBM's power in that market.
ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Telex
Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975). Similarly, Kodak's introduction in 1972 of the
110 pocket instamatic camera system was challenged by a competing manufacturer and
photo-processor, Berkey Photo, who alleged that the new camera system was introduced
for the purpose of leveraging Kodak's monopoly power in the film market, the primary
market, into increased market power in the secondary camera market. Berkey Photo, Inc.
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 279 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3517
(U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (Nos. 79-427, 79-499). In addition, Berkey alleged that the 110 camera
system permitted Kodak to increase its power in the film market. In this case, film would
be the secondary market and cameras the primary. Id. at 293.
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they differ in the nature of the tie. The tie in a physical tie-in results
from the physical compatibility of the new products with each other
and their initial physical incompatibility with competing products.
With traditional tying arrangements, however, there need be no
physical relation between the tied products. Rather, the source of the
tie is some contract, agreement, or understanding that requires a pur-
chaser buying a good from a particular seller to buy another good
from the same seller.20 Second, physical tie-ins and traditional tying
arrangements differ in who determines their duration. The time period
of a tying arrangement is defined by the initial parties and is potentially
permanent,21 while a physical tie-in lasts only as long as it takes a
competitor to develop a compatible product. Finally, because of their
differing duration, the reasons for creating traditional tying arrange-
ments and physical tie-ins differ.22 These three differences make it
inappropriate to'apply the economic and legal analysis of traditional
tying arrangements to physical tie-ins.23
B. Benefits of Physical Tie-Ins
Innovation and technological progress are the primary sources of
longrun increases in consumer welfare,24 and it is the rate of innova-
20. For example, a manufacturer of tabulating machines may lease his machines only
on condition that the lessee agree to purchase all of his tabulating cards from the lessor
for as long as he leases the machine. IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 134 (1936).
21. For example, a manufacturer of salt-dispensing machines may sell only on condi-
tion that the buyer agree to purchase all his future salt requirements from the seller.
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 394 (1947).
22. Robert Bork offers five possible explanations for the creation of traditional tying
arrangements: (I) evasion of price regulation, (2) price discrimination, (3) nondiscrimina-
tory measurement of use, (4) economies of scale, and (5) technological interdependence or
the protection of goodwill. R. BORK, supra note 12, at 376. In addition, where the tied
goods can be used in variable proportions, there is a further possible explanation: (6)
increased monopoly profits. See W. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAw 76-88 (1973).
Although reasons (4), (5), and (6) possibly would explain the creation of a physical tie-in
as well, especially if the firm is prevented by law from employing a traditional tying
arrangement, the chances of achieving for an extended period any of these objectives by
means of a physical tie-in would appear to be small, because the tie of a physical tie-in
is of uncertain duration and is terminated by the first competitor who develops a com-
patible imitation. It appears much more likely that the true basis for a firm's creating a
physical tie-in is to be found in terms of the technological requirements of the product
or in terms of the firm's predatory intent.
23. For discussions of the law and economics of traditional tying arrangements, see 3
P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 733 (1978) [hereinafter cited as AREEDA &
TURNER]; Bowman, Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19
(1957); Markovits, Tie-Ins, Leverage, and the Antitrust Laws, 80 YALE LJ. 195 (1970).
24. These factors contribute far more to consumer welfare than does the elimination
of allocative inefficiencies. See 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 23, 407 at 284; F. SCHERER,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 346 (1970); J. Markham,
Concentration: A Stimulant or Retardant to Innovation in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION:
THE NEW LrARNING 253-54 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann, & J. Weston eds., 1974).
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tion that largely determines the rate of technological progress. 25 Phys-
ical tie-ins, a form of innovation, 20 may confer both direct and indirect
benefits on consumers. The direct benefits may derive from the product
pair itself, which may better satisfy consumer preferences directly if it
is totally new, if it is better in all its characteristics than existing
products, if it is physically equivalent to but less expensive than exist-
ing products, or if it constitutes a new combination of characteristics
that was previously unavailable.2 7 Alternatively, it may benefit con-
sumers by serving as a more efficient input in other production pro-
cesses.28 On the other hand, if the physical tie-in represents merely a
redesign of the coupling or compatibility of the two products, there
may be no direct benefit to consumers.
Physical tie-ins may also confer indirect benefits. Most important,
physical tie-ins, like other forms of innovation, tend to engender fur-
ther innovation.2 9 In addition, they may increase employment by
25. See 2 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 23, T 407a at 284.
26. The term innovation is used broadly here. It is not restricted to major inventions,
but rather includes any material modification of existing products or the introduction of
any new product.
27. The following example illustrates this point. Assume that only two types of auto-
mobiles are available to consumers-Rolls-Royces and Volkswagens. Further assume that
consumers are concerned with only two characteristics of these automobiles-gas economy
and comfort. Consumers will be made better off if the two manufacturers introduce new
models with improved gas economy and comfort, which are sold at the old prices, or
if they simply lower the price on existing models. Moreover, some consumers, at least,
will be made better off if a third manufacturer introduces a new model automobile that
lies somewhere between the Rolls-Royce and Volkswagen in terms of gas economy, com-
fort, and price. See Lancaster, Allocation and Distribution Theory: Technological In-
novation and Progress, 56 AmER. ECON. REv.: PAPERS & PROC. 14, 20-22 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Allocation and Distribution Theory]. See generally Lancaster, A New Approach to
Consumer Theory, 74 J. POL. ECON. 132 (1966) (more mathematical treatment).
28. It is possible that the benefits of a physical tie-in may be due solely to one of the
two complementary products. For example, IBM might develop a new computer line
consisting of an improved CPU and new interface, but for which the peripheral devices
have no advantages over existing peripherals. In such a case, it might be appropriate to
consider whether the change in interface was necessary for the improvements in the CPU.
In most cases, however, both products will contribute to the benefits consumers receive.
For example, Kodak could not have offered the 110 pocket instamatic camera, which fits
into a shirt pocket, if it had not developed the smaller 110 film cartridge.
29. Competitors have an incentive to imitate and to improve upon the innovation so
that they can share in the temporary monopoly gains accruing to the new products and
so that they can regain any business that may have been lost as a result of the innova-
tion. See 1 BUSINESS CYCLES, supra note 15, at 100-01, 131; Kamien & Schwartz, Market
Structure and Innovation: A Survey, 13 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1, 27-31 (1975). Moreover, the
physical tie-in may serve as a general example of the profits that might be made through
innovation and of the losses that might be suffered should competitors innovate first. See
CAPITALSM, supra note 15, at 84-85, 90; Kamien & Schwartz, supra, at 30. Finally, the
physical tie-in may also encourage further innovation by providing new technical in-
formation that others can use in developing further innovations. See In Search, supra
note 11, at 56-60; R. Nelson, R & D, Knowledge, and Externalities 4, 15-18 (1977) (Working
Paper 787, Institution for Social and Policy Studies, Yale University).
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creating new demands or by increasing demands for existing products. 30
Although most of the benefits of physical tie-ins are difficult to mea-
sure,31 they can be significant 32 and should be considered in determin-
ing the legality of tie-ins under the antitrust laws.
C. Costs of Physical Tie-Ins
The primary cost of a physical tie-in is that it may exclude com-
petitors in the secondary market or deter potential competitors from
entering that market, which may result in the welfare losses associated
with monopoly.3 3 Analysis of these potential costs is complicated, how-
ever, because physical tie-ins generally involve the creation of new
products and markets (or submarkets), changes in the pattern of con-
sumer demands, and temporary disequilibrium in one or more markets.
These temporary disequilibrium effects of physical tie-ins, which society
should tolerate, must be distinguished from possible permanent effects
on market structure.34
30. BUSINESS CYCLES, supra note 15, at 145; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 15, at
230.
31. The first difficulty arises from problems associated with measuring the direct
benefits to consumers of a new product. Although some progress has been made in
applying consumers'-surplus analysis to the question of product differentiation, see
Schmalensee, Entry in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry, 9 BELL J. ECON. 305,
319-21 (1978); Spence, Product Differentiation and Welfare, 66 AMER. EcoN. REV.: PAPERS
AND PROC. 407 (1976), economists have yet to develop a theory of demand that adequately
encompasses the introduction of new products and the resulting evolution in demands and
consumer preferences.
Second, it is even more difficult to measure the beneficial externalities of a particular
innovation-i.e., the extent to which it spawns further innovation and the benefits yielded
by those subsequent innovations-since this requires both a prediction of the innovations
that might subsequently be developed and an estimation of the innovations that would
have been developed in the absence of this new innovation.
32. See F. SCHERER, supra note 24, at 346-47; Markham, supra note 24, at 252-54.
33. The most widely recognized welfare loss associated with monopoly is a con-
sequence of the restriction of a monopolist's output, which results from his ability to
raise his price above the level that would result in a competitive market. Although such
an output restriction may yield the monopolist a gain in producers' surplus, this gain is
always outweighed by the loss in consumers' surplus. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8-11 (1976); F. SCHERER, supra note 24, at 13-14, 400-04. In addition,
it has been argued that monopolists, because they are sheltered from the rigors of competi-
tion, are more likely to incur higher costs through inefficient operation and to innovate
less. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945); 2
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 23, 403c at 272; F. SCHERER, supra note 24, at 13, 35-36,
405-08; Williamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market Failure Con-
siderations, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1512, 1514-22 (1972). But see R. POSNER, supra, at 15-16
(monopolists will seek to minimize costs and maximize profits in order to grow and to
increase their chances of survival in a world of uncertainty); Schumpeterian Trade-Off,
supra note 15, at 5-8 (monopolists will tend to innovate more because they can better
appropriate the gains from innovation; also, society will benefit more from innovations
introduced by monopolists, since they will be introduced throughout the market, rather
than being limited to share of the market possessed by the innovating firm).
34. See pp. 776-77, 788 infra.
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1. Schumpeter's Dynamic Theory of Innovation Competition
Joseph Schumpeter's theory of competition and the role of innova-
tion provides a framework for analyzing the social costs of innova-
tion.35 The basic tenets of Schumpeter's theory are: (i) the introduction
of any new product will cause a departure from competitive equilib-
rium such that the innovator enjoys monopoly gains and competitors
suffer losses; 36 (ii) these gains and losses generally will be only tem-
porary and will be eliminated as competitors adapt and imitate; 37 and
(iii) innovators often will attempt to transform their temporary monop-
oly power into a permanent monopoly position.38 Schumpeter argues
that since innovation is "the powerful lever that in the long run ex-
pands output and brings down prices,"39 the social gains arising from
innovation far outweigh the losses due to temporary deviations from the
model of perfect competition.40 It is competition through innovation,
not competition in the sense of the static competitive market model,
that maximizes longrun consumer welfare. 41
Temporary monopoly profits should be tolerated, Schumpeter
argues,42 not only because they are the natural result of the innovation
process, but more importantly, because they provide the necessary in-
centive for firms to innovate.43 Schumpeter recognizes, however, firms'
natural tendency to try to transform their temporary monopoly gain
into permanent monopoly power, which might result in losses to
society. Thus, he does not advocate eliminating all antitrust regula-
35. See note 15 supra (citing sources).
36. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 15, at 131-32; Schumpeterian Competition,
supra note 15, at 524. Schumpeter emphasizes that "the introduction of new methods of
production and new commodities is hardly conceivable with perfect-and perfectly
prompt-competition from the start," and that "perfect competition is and always has
been temporarily suspended whenever anything new is being introduced .. . even in
otherwise perfectly competitive conditions," CAPITALISM, supra note 15, at 105.
37. BUSINESS CYCLES, supra note 15, at 105; ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note
15, at 131.
38. CAPITALISM, supra note 15, at 88-92.
39. Id. at 85.
40. Antitrust commentators generally have ignored this insight. For example, while
Professors Areeda and Turner recognize that a "satisfactory rate of innovative activity...
depends upon significant departures from the assumptions of perfect competition, and
... [that] there are inevitable time lags of varying duration, before rivals can learn and
copy the details of the innovator's new product," they fail to develop the implications of
this observation, but consider instead the question of whether large firms or firms pos-
sessing monopoly power are better innovators than smaller or less powerful firms. 2
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 23, 407a at 284-85.
41. CAPITALISM, supra note 15, at 85; F. SCHERER, supra note 24, at 346.
42. CAPITALISM, supra note 15, at 87-91.
43. Id. at 87-88, 90; see Kamien & Schwartz, supra note 29, at 14. This principle that
temporary monopoly provides the necessary incentive for innovation also underlies the
patent law. See p. 789 infra.
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tion.44 Schumpeter's theory suggests that in analyzing the costs of a
physical tie-in, the relevant issue is not whether the tie-in confers
temporary monopoly power, but the magnitude of these temporary
monopoly gains and whether, and how quickly, these gains will be
eroded.45
2. The Possibility of Longrun Exclusionary Effects
Under certain conditions, a physical tie-in may increase the in-
novator's longrun market power. This is demonstrated by the follow-
ing simple, though extreme, example. Assume the following condi-
tions hold: 40 (i) the innovator is the dominant firm in both primary
and secondary markets; (ii) significant barriers to entry exist,47 but be-
cause of existing and potential competition, the innovator practices
limit pricing in both markets;48 (iii) the physical tie-in replaces the
44. CAPITALISM, supra note 15, at 91.
45. This distinction between temporary and persistent monopoly power is similar to
the traditional economists' distinction between shortrun and longrun monopoly power.
Shortrun monopoly power is generally defined as the power of a firm to raise its price
above its marginal cost, while longrun monopoly power generally implies the additional
power to restrict competition or to exclude competitors. A firm may have the shortrun
power to control its price without having any longrun power to restrict competition.
Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The Realemon Case, 127 U.
PA. L. REv. 994, 1005 (1979). Although frequently overlooked by judges deciding antitrust
cases, this distinction is central in determining whether a particular firm has violated
the antitrust laws. Id.
46. As argued below, these conditions are sufficient, but not necessary, for a physical
tie-in to have a longrun exclusionary effect.
47. Professor Stigler has defined a "barrier to entry" as a "cost of producing (at some
or every rate of output) which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an industry
but is not borne by firms already in the industry." G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF
INDUSTRY 67 (1968). Although there is considerable disagreement, the following are
frequently mentioned as barriers to entry: (1) legal limitations, such as patents and trade
secret protection; (2) possession of an essential or superior resource, such as a raw ma-
terial; (3) advertising and established buyer preference for brand names; (4) product
differentiation; (5) higher capital costs for new entrants, resulting from greater uncer-
tainty as to their probable success; and (6) increased costs resulting from the entrant's
inexperience in producing for that market. See AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 23, 409
at 298-306; F. SCHERER, supra note 24, at 230. But see Posner, The Chicago School of
Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925, 945-46 (1979) (under Stigler's definition, only
(5) above could be considered a barrier to entry, and in practice such higher capital
costs would pose no great obstacle to entrants).
Economists, approaching the problem of entry in a dynamic context, have emphasized
recently that firms already in a market have certain strategic advantages, such as. excess
capacity, product differentiation, advertising, and innovation, which they can employ to
intimidate and deter the entry of potential rivals. Although such strategic advanta es may
not fall within Stigler's definition, they do pose obstacles to potential entrants. See.ITevin,
Technical Change, Barriers to Entry, and Market Structure, 45 ECONOAIICA 347 :'(l978);
Salop, Strategic Entry Deterrence, 69 AMER. ECON. REv.: PAPERS AND PROC. 335 (1979).
48. The concept of "limit pricing" is based on the observation that if a monopolist or
a group of collusive oligopolists sets a price that maximizes shortrun profits and thus earns
some monopoly profit, this might attract new rivals into the market, which will result in
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innovator's existing products; 49 (iv) competitors must incur significant
fixed development costs equal to those already incurred by the in-
novator in order to imitate the new complementary secondary pro-
duct;50 and (v) the innovator's and imitator's variable costs of produc-
tion are equal.51
Given these conditions, the exclusionary effect of the physical tie-in
can be shown by considering the effect of the tie-in on existing com-
petitors in the secondary market and on potential entrants into that
market. Existing competitors will be affected in three ways. First, the
demand for competitors' incompatible, complementary secondary pro-
ducts will drop as consumers shift to the new products.52 Second, to
an eventual reduction in price and corresponding erosion of monopoly returns. Clark,
Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AMER. EcoN. REv. 241, 247-48 (1940). In
such concentrated markets it is recognized that existing firms that seek to maximize
profits over the longrun and to maintain their market shares might set prices just low
enough to make entry unprofitable. If the market exhibits economies of scale or barriers
to entry, the existing firms may still be able to earn some monopoly profits even at this
limit price, though profits will be lower than those obtained at the shortrun profit-
maximizing price. See F. SCHERER, supra note 24, at 219-24.
49. A physical tie-in that replaces the innovator's existing products rather than sup-
plementing the existing product line will exacerbate the loss in demand and consequent
revenue loss that secondary-market competitors will experience. See note 52 infra. In con-
trast, manufacturers of competing primary goods and secondary goods compatible with
those competing goods may experience an increase in demand if buyers of the innovator's
previous product pair fail to adopt the new product pair.
50. These costs include the costs of researching and designing new compatible com-
plementary products, the costs of retooling plant and equipment in order to produce
these new goods, and the losses arising from inventories of now obsolete goods. See Com-
ment, supra note 1, at 224; Note, Innovation Competition: Beyond Telex v. IBM, 28
STAN. L. REv. 285, 296 (1976). The assumption that the lump-sum costs imposed on in-
novators equal those imposed on competitors was made merely for purposes of illustration.
In practice, the innovator is likely to experience higher costs of development than imita-
tors because it often is easier to copy than to invent. See Schumpeterian Trade-Off, supra
note 15, at 6.
51. Variable production costs are assumed equal because there is no obvious way, a
priori, to tell whether variable costs will be higher for the innovator or imitator or how
these costs will compare to the variable costs of producing the earlier products.
52. To the extent that the new complementary product pair or system offers ad-
vantages over existing products, buyers are likely to purchase the new products when
otherwise they would have purchased the old (of course, some entirely new purchasers
may enter the market as well). As a result, the demand for existing primary and secondary
products will drop, and competitors producing secondary products that are incompatible
with the new primary product will suffer a revenue loss. The drop in demand for pre-
viously compatible secondary products will be exacerbated if the innovator stops selling
his previous primary and secondary products at the same time that he introduces his
new products, since buyers then will be deprived of the choice of purchasing the earlier
primary products for which competitors produce compatible complements.
In some cases, the tie-in may affect competitors' revenues even before it is formally
introduced. If the innovator announces that he has developed an improved product pair
before he is ready to offer it on the market, potential buyers may postpone their purchases
until the new products are available. As a result, a competitor's newly developed secondary
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the extent that competitors attempt to imitate the new secondary
products in order to offer goods compatible with the new primary
goods, they will incur higher fixed costs proportionate to output than
are incurred by the innovator, and hence proportionately higher unit
costs. 5 3 Third, and most important, the tie-in may signal secondary-
market competitors that another tie-in could be introduced, should
they compete too vigorously.54 As a result of these three effects, some
competitors may be driven out of business, and the remaining com-
petitors, because of their economic injuries or because of their fear of
further physical tie-ins, may compete less vigorously. The tie-in also
will tend to discourage potential rivals from entering by raising barriers
to entryc5 and by signaling potential competitors of the innovator's
power to make their products obsolete by simply introducing another
physical tie-in. Because the physical tie-in simultaneously disciplines or
eliminates existing competitors and deters the entry of new com-
petitors, the overall result will be that the innovator is able to raise
product may be made obsolete even though no alternative is yet available. Moreover,
while such an early announcement can result in earlier demand decreases for competitors,
it need not reduce competitors' imitation lag time, as an announcement is unlikely to
contain sufficient technical information to aid competitors in imitation. Note, supra note
50, at 293-94; cf. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 440
(N.D. Cal. 1978) (plaintiff Memorex contended that IBM's "phased announcements" of
new products "made it more difficult for Memorex to keep pace").
It should be emphasized, however, that these revenue losses of competitors are private
costs and not relevant social costs, see A. C. Picou, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 188-90
(4th ed. 1932), except to the extent that they result in a subsequent increase in market
concentration and hence in an increase in the social costs of monopoly.
53. This result follows directly from the assumptions that the innovator is the dominant
firm in the secondary market, and that the lump-sum costs and variable costs to innovator
and to imitator are equal, since the innovator, having a larger output over which to
spread the lump-sum costs, consequently will have lower average or unit costs. See Areeda
& Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
88 HARv. L. REv. 697, 732 (1975). In addition, it is generally true that the more quickly a
competitor attempts to develop a compatible secondary product, the higher will be his
costs of imitation. See Kamien & Schwartz, supra note 29, at 8. Thus competitors are
forced to undertake rapid but expensive imitation if they wish to compete immediately
with the new secondary product, or to suffer prolonged reduction in demand and revenue
if they continue to attempt to sell their existing products.
54. See Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 12, at 214-15; Williamson, Williamson on
Predatory Pricing II, 88 YALE L.J. 1183, 1185 (1979).
55. The physical tie-in may directly strengthen entry barriers by raising the fixed costs
associated with entering the market, see note 53 supra, and possibly by making it more
difficult for new entrants to produce, at a competitive cost, commodities currently desired
by consumers (i.e., by raising the costs of inexperienced producers relative to those of
experienced producers), see Arrow, The Economic Implications of Learning By Doing, 29
REv. ECON. STUD. 155 (1962); Hirsch, Manufacturing Progress Functions, 34 REv. ECON.
& STATISTICS 143 (1952). In addition, the tie-in may indirectly increase barriers to entry
by raising the cost of capital to new entrants because of lenders' greater uncertainty as to
the entrant's probable success. See 2 AREEDA & TuRNEn, supra note 23, 409 at 303-05.
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his limit price and restrict supply,56 thus causing the traditional welfare
losses associated with monopoly. 57
3. Factors Determining the Likelihood of Longrun
Exclusionary Effects
Although the above example demonstrates that under certain condi-
tions a physical tie-in can have a longrun exclusionary effect on com-
petition, it will not always have such an effect. The result will depend
on the characteristics of the primary and secondary markets58 and of
the tie-in itself.
Among these relevant market characteristics, the most important is
the innovator's prior market power in the primary and secondary
markets. Because market power cannot be measured directly, it is
necessary to consider such indicia as market share, barriers to entry,
56. The use of physical tie-ins to increase longrun market power is similar in many
ways to the use of predatory pricing. In both cases the effectiveness of the strategy will
depend on the characteristics of the market involved. Furthermore, both forms of be-
havior, when employed in a predatory manner, will result in a drop in demand and a
loss of revenue to competitors. In the case of predatory pricing, the shift in demand
results from the predator's lower price relative to his competitors. If the competitors at-
tempt to meet the lower price they will suffer revenue losses and possibly absolute losses
due to their lower price. With physical tie-ins, the drop in demand results from the in-
troduction of a new primary product that is incompatible with competitors' secondary
products. If competitors attempt to develop compatible products, they will suffer the
costs of imitation as well as the costs of obsolete inventories. Both forms of predatory
behavior also may be used in a strategic manner to raise barriers to entry and to signal
competitors of threatened repeated actions. Finally, both forms of behavior, if effective,
permit the predator to increase his market share and raise his limit price. See Baumol,
Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89
YALE L.J. 1, 2-3 (1979); Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis,
87 YALE L.J. 284, 292-93 (1977).
In certain situations, a physical tie-in may be more effective than predatory pricing in
imposing greater losses on competitors than are incurred by the predator. If the predator
has a large market share and the costs of imitation are high, then a physical tie-in may
impose proportionately greater unit costs on competitors than on the predator, and this
disparity will increase as the predator's market share increases. See pp. 778-79 supra. More-
over, the shift in demand toward the predator's new product may actually result in an
increase in shortrun profits. With predatory pricing, on the other hand, the larger the
predator's market share, the greater will be his absolute losses, especially to the extent
that his market share increases as a result of his below-cost pricing. See R. BORK, supra
note 12, at 149-52.
57. See note 33 supra.
58. Considerable uncertainty will inevitably attend any inference of "long-run market
outcomes from observable short-run behavior and short-run market conditions." Joskow
& Klevorick, supra note 12, at 217. Nevertheless, the structure of the market and the
nature of the conduct will significantly determine the probability that such a longrun
increase in concentration can occur. Moreover, market structure will influence the
relative size of the social costs resulting from any increase in market concentration.
Finally, since the structure of the market will determine the potential private gain from
any attempted predatory behavior, examining market structure can aid in estimating the
likelihood that a firm would engage in predatory actions. Id. at 223-35.
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profit margins, and the elasticity of demand.59 The most important of
these is the innovator's primary market share, for if there are other
sizeable primary-product manufacturers that produce goods for which
the secondary-market manufacturers produce compatible complemen-
tary goods, the secondary-market competitors will not suffer as large a
displacement of business and consequent revenue loss. Moreover, to
the extent that there are comparable competing primary and secondary
goods, the innovator's ability to raise prices and restrict supply is
reduced.60
The innovator generally must also have a large secondary market
share for welfare losses to occur, since without a large secondary market
share he would be unlikely to have sufficient capacity to produce all
compatible secondary goods formerly supplied by competitors.6 ' In
addition, he would be producing fewer units over which he could
spread the fixed costs of developing the new product and retooling for
its production, and thus would have little or no cost advantage over
his rivals.
Other factors determining market power in the secondary market
are also relevant. First, if barriers to entry in the secondary market are
low, the innovator would be unable to raise his price without inviting
the entry of new competitors who could produce compatible secondary
products. 62 Second, if the market elasticity of demand in the secondary
market is high, the triangular welfare losses resulting from monopoly
59. 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 23, 801-807 at 290-94; P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS, 228-241 at 195-203 (2d ed. 1974).
60. P. AREEDA, supra note 59, 233-240 at 198-203; Schmalensee, supra note 45, at
1010-12.
61. This may be illustrated by the following example. Suppose IBM controlled 100%
of the CPU market but only 25% of the market for peripheral equipment. If it introduced
a new CPU, which it produced at full capacity, it would be unable to produce a cor-
responding output of peripheral equipment unless it previously had been operating at
only 25% capacity in peripherals, which is unlikely. To the extent that IBM had to
expand its capacity for producing peripheral equipment, competitors would have ad-
ditional time to develop compatible peripheral equipment, with the result that IBM most
likely would be thwarted in its attempt to obtain complete control over production of
peripherals. Cf. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 280 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3517 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (Nos. 79-427, 79-499) (Kodak in 1965
predisclosed information concerning its new Super-8 movie films to competing movie-
camera manufacturers because of its small share in that market). The above argument
will not hold, however, if the innovator has excess capacity in some other area of produc-
tion that can be converted quickly to the production of the new secondary products. Thus,
in the above example, IBM would have little trouble gaining at least a temporary monop-
oly in peripherals if it had sufficient excess capacity in the production of CPU's and if
this capacity could be shifted quickly to producing the new peripheral equipment.
62. Low entry barriers thus ensure that the monopoly power an innovator gains as a
result of his innovation will only be temporary. See 2 ARaaaA & TURNER, supra note 23,
409 at 298-306; F. SCHERER, supra note 24, at 219-22.
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would be less. 63 Third, the size and nature of competitors also affects
the innovator's market power and his ability to exclude secondary-
market competitors by means of a physical tie-in. To the extent the
competitors are large, financially strong, and innovative, they would
be better able to weather the temporary losses caused by the innova-
tion and to imitate and adapt more quickly. Thus, a few strong com-
petitors, in contrast to many weak competitors, might prevent a tie-in
from having any permanent effect.
In addition to the factors affecting the innovator's market power, the
dynamic characteristics of both markets are relevant to the analysis. To
the extent that demand is growing in the secondary market, new en-
trants as well as existing competitors, lured by the prospect of in-
creasing profits, are more likely to resist the innovator's efforts to gain
monopoly power in the secondary market.14 Moreover, competitors in
the secondary market are more likely to be able to produce comple-
mentary products for other primary product manufacturers if demand
is growing in the latter market. Similarly, if both markets exhibit high
rates of innovation, then it is likely that any monopoly power acquired
by the innovator could be supplanted easily by a competitor's sub-
sequent innovation.65
Finally, the characteristics of the physical tie-in itself must be con-
sidered. If the physical tie-in is an addition to the innovator's product
line rather than a replacement for existing products, the shift in
demand from competitors' secondary products to the innovator's new
product should be less severe. 60 In addition, the time required for
imitation, and the competitors' cost of imitation relative to the in-
novator's cost of development, may be relevant.
63. See Joskow & Klevorick, suPra note 12, at 226-27.
64. This argument resembles that underlying the theory of limit pricing, since in both
cases new rivals are attracted into the apparently profitable market. See note 48 supra.
65. This conclusion may not hold, however, when the innovator consistently has been
the leader in innovation. Moreover, to the extent that the innovation is significant and
involves a technology exhibiting a "natural trajectory" (i.e., where subsequent innovations
build from or grow out of the initial innovation), In Search, suPra note 11, at 56-60, the
original innovator has the advantage of being the first to possess the relevant knowledge
and thus may gain a headstart in developing further innovations. Nevertheless, since in
both these situations society is likely to benefit from further innovation, such expected
benefits should be weighed against any probable increase in market concentration.
Finally, while there is reason to believe that markets exhibiting a high rate of innova-
tion have a tendency toward greater concentration, see Schumpeterian Trade-Off, supra
note 15, at 9, this does not mean that the innovator, rather than one or more rivals,
will gain dominance. In fact, when imitation is relatively inexpensive, imitation may
prove the more profitable strategy. Id. at 6, 17, 20, 30-32, 39.
66. See note 52 supra.
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D. Weighing Costs and Benefits
1. Evaluating the Particular Tie-In
The practical difficulties involved in measuring the social costs of
the temporary monopoly that arise from innovation ' make any assess-
ment purely speculative. Thus, it seems reasonable, following Schumpe-
ter, to ignore these costs and simplify the welfare economic analysis by
only weighing the expected longrun costs of increased monopoly against
the social benefits of the physical tie-in.
The factors discussed above not only will determine the probability
that a longrun increase in concentration will occur, but also will in-
dicate the relative size of the resulting costs of monopoly.68 If an
evaluation of these factors suggests that no longrun increase in market
concentration will result from the physical tie-in, then the physical
tie-in must yield a net social benefit greater than or equal to zero, and
no further weighing need be done. If, however, the evaluation sug-
gests the likelihood of increased longrun market concentration as a
result of the tie-in, then it becomes necessary to weigh these expected
welfare losses against the potential benefits of the physical tie-in. This
second-stage balancing will be even more speculative than the first
stage, however, because the potential benefits are harder to measure. 69
Nevertheless, two indicators may be used to estimate benefits from the
tie-in itself: first, whether the physical tie-in is less costly or more
efficient than existing products, and second, whether the physical tie-in
offers a distinctively new combination of features that was previously
unavailable.70 In addition, the innovator's past performance in terms
67. These difficulties stem in part from the dynamic disequilibrium nature of the
temporary monopoly state. More important, however, are the difficulties in determining
what state should be compared with this temporary monopoly. If consumer welfare
before the introduction of the physical tie-in is compared with that immediately after
the introduction, it will most likely be true that consumers have benefited from the
tie-in, despite its being offered at a monopoly price. Such an empirical comparison could
not actually be performed, however, as the partial equilibrium approach of consumers'
surplus analysis would be inadequate in this context, and no feasible general equilibrium
approach to such a weighing has yet been developed. If, on the other hand, a welfare
comparison were made between the tie-in sold at a monopoly price and the tie-in sold at
a competitive price, it would be necessary to consider further whether the tie actually
would have been introduced at the same time in the latter case, or whether it might have
been delayed or never introduced at all. As a practical matter, this comparison of the
timing of the tie-in introduction would, of course, be impossible, because of the difficulty
in evaluating incentives. Given these difficulties in welfare analysis, and given that any
costs of the temporary monopoly are likely to be small relative to longrun effects, it
seems best to ignore these temporary disequilibrium effects.
68. See note 58 supra.
69. See note 31 supra.
70. See p. 774 sutra.
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of innovation should be examined to determine the likelihood that he
will continue to develop socially beneficial innovations in the future.71
Three examples will illustrate how this weighing can be done. First,
assume that the innovator has a small market share in both markets,
that new competitors can easily enter the secondary market, that imita-
tion costs are low, and that the physical tie-in is significantly cheaper
or better than existing products. Because of low entry barriers and the
innovator's small market share, no significant increase in market con-
centration will result,72 yet consumers will have benefited from the
innovation. The physical tie-in is clearly socially beneficial and should
be legal.
Second, suppose that assumptions (i)-(v) of the example in the
previous section hold. These assumptions imply that there is a sig-
nificant, positive expected cost of monopoly resulting from the physical
tie-in. If the further assumption were made, (vi) that the physical tie-in
is not a different, more efficient, or cheaper product mix, but rather
involves merely a change in the coupling or compatibility of the com-
ponents, then it follows that the physical tie-in represents a net cost to
society, and should be held unlawful.7 3
Finally, retain assumptions (i)-(v) of the previous example, but alter
assumption (vi) so that the physical tie-in represents a significant im-
provement over the innovator's and competitor's existing products. In
addition, assume that the creator of the tie-in has been the leader in
innovation in these markets. In this example, the weighing is more
difficult because both significant social costs and social benefits result
from the tie-in, neither of which can be measured with any great ac-
71. While past innovative performance is not a perfect predictor of future performance,
it may suggest that the innovator has certain special talents or advantages in research and
development that should not be discouraged. On the other hand, such an investigation
of previous innovations may reveal repeated introductions of nonbeneficial tie-ins, used
to obtain shortrun monopoly profits.
72. This follows for two reasons. First, competitors are not likely to be injured
significantly, since their per-unit costs of imitation should not be significantly higher than
the innovator's original cost of development. See note 53 supra. Second, if the innovating
firm has, for example, only a 5% share of the secondary market, it is unlikely to have
sufficient excess capacity to preempt the market entirely. In the time it would take for
the innovating firm to develop such capacity, competitors should be able to develop and
market compatible secondary products. See p. 781 supra.
73. If there were merely temporary rather than longrun monopoly effects, a physical
tie-in involving only a change in the coupling or compatibility of the physical comple-
ments and thus providing no new benefits to consumers should be held legal even though
it would still represent a net cost to society. The reason the antitrust laws should not
condemn these cases is that they are likely to be rare and a contrary holding may have
significant adverse effects on incentives to innovate. These incentive effects are discussed
at p. 785 infra.
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curacy. The welfare analysis appears inconclusive, yet the tie-in should
be held legal for another reason: the possible disincentives for innova-
tion caused by holding a physical tie-in illegal.
2. Incentive Effects in Developing a Legal Rule
The analysis so far has focused only on the costs and benefits to
society of particular physical tie-ins. In formulating a legal rule govern-
ing physical tie-ins, however, it is necessary to focus not only on the
social costs and benefits of particular tie-ins but also on the way in
which a particular legal rule will affect incentives for innovation.
The rate of innovation depends significantly on the expected return
to innovation,74 which in turn depends largely on the size of the ex-
pected temporary monopoly profits. 75 The threat of litigation under
an overly broad rule and the attendant potential legal expenses and
treble damage fines70 could significantly reduce the expected return on
innovations and thus chill the incentive to innovate.7 7 Furthermore,
such a rule may have serious adverse effects on the form of innovation,
as firms attempt to adjust their innovations so as to make them legal.7 8
These incentive effects suggest that in close cases physical tie-ins should
be held lawful so that beneficial innovation will not be chilled.
74. The rate of innovation depends both on the level of expenditures on research and
development and on the effectiveness of that research and development. Since research
and development is costly, its level will depend largely on the expected private return.
See W. BOWMAN, supra note 22, at 36-37; Nelson, supra note 29, at 1-2.
75. The importance of temporary monopoly profits in encouraging innovations has
been recognized not only by economists, see, e.g., EcoNoMlc DEVELOPMENT, supra note 15,
at 128-56, but also by Congress in enacting the patent laws, Title 35 U.S.C. (1976), and by
the courts, see, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974); Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 283 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W.
3517 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (Nos. 79-427, 79-499).
76. Clayton Act § 4 provides that any private person "injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws ... shall recover threefold
the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
77. In analyzing the somewhat analogous problem of predatory pricing, Areeda and
Turner make essentially the same argument: "extreme care [should] be taken in formu-
lating such rules [against predatory pricing], lest the threat of litigation, particularly by
private parties, materially deter legitimate, competitive pricing." Areeda & Turner, supra
note 53, at 699.
78. An overly broad rule is likely to induce firms to develop new primary goods that
are compatible with existing secondary goods in order to avoid suit, even though the
resulting system may be less efficient or more expensive than a system developed without
such legal constraints. Cf. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423,
440 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (plaintiff alleging that IBM had acted unlawfully in not designing
its new CPU's so as to be compatible with plaintiff's existing peripherals); Telex Corp.
v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 341-42 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975) (same).
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II. Legal Analysis
If the antitrust laws are concerned at all with economic efficiency,
then a sound economic understanding of physical tie-ins is essential
for the development of appropriate legal standards.7 9 A principled rule
of reason approach to physical tie-ins can be derived from antitrust
policies and precedents and the foregoing economic analysis.
A. The Necessity of a Narrow and Well-defined Legal Standard
A legal standard governing physical tie-ins should be judged, first
and foremost, by how well it distinguishes between tie-ins conferring
net social benefits and those imposing net social costs. In addition, it
is necessary to consider how the rule influences the activities of firms,
especially their innovative activities, and how difficult or costly it is
for courts to implement.80 Application of these criteria to physical tie-
ins suggests that an appropriate legal standard should be narrow and
well-defined.
The preceding economic analysis demonstrates that a physical tie-in
can impose longrun social costs through increased market concentra-
tion only under certain limited conditions. Even then, however, the
benefits of the tie-in may exceed its costs. Because of this significant
possibility that physical tie-ins will be socially beneficial, any standards
for determining their illegality must be drawn sufficiently narrowly
that beneficial tie-ins will not be condemned.
A narrow and well-defined rule also would reduce innovative firm
uncertainty concerning the legality of its physical tie-ins and thus
79. Schmalensee, supra note 45, at 994-95. Although there exists considerable disagree-
ment among commentators concerning the appropriate objectives of antitrust policy, com-
pare, e.g., I AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 23, 103-113, at 7-33 (economic efficiency and
the maximization of consumer economic welfare should be the exclusive goal of antitrust
policy) and R. BORK, supra note 12, at 7 (same) and W. BOWMAN, suPra note 22, at 1 (same)
with Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What
Else Counts? 125 U. PA. L. Rav. 1191 (1977) (equity as well as efficiency considerations are
relevant to antitrust policy) and Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA.
L. REv. 1051 (1979) (political values should enter into antitrust policy), even those who
advocate the inclusion of noneconomic objectives in formulating antitrust policy,
acknowledge that economic considerations should remain of primary importance, see, e.g.,
Elzinga, supra, at 1191-92; Pitofsky, supra, at 1075.
80. These criteria underlie the decision-theoretic framework that economists have
applied in evaluating legal standards in other contexts. Under this approach, alternative
legal standards are evaluated in terms of (a) the probability that they will cause particular
types of errors, (b) the costs of such errors, and (c) the costs of implementing the various
standards. The standard selected is that which minimizes the sum of the expected costs of
error and the cost of implementation. See, e.g., Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 12 (ap-
plying decision-theoretic analysis in choosing among alternative predatory pricing rules).
See generally H. RAiFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS (1968).
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would increase its incentive to innovate."' In addition, such a stan-
dard would reduce the incentives for competitors to bring suit chal-
lenging the legality of socially beneficial tie-ins, 2 which would not only
increase innovators' incentives but also would limit the burdens that
excessive litigation places on the courts.8 3
Finally, provided that it is appropriately defined, a narrow, clear
standard would reduce the probability of judicial mistakes in analyzing
physical tie-ins, a danger particularly acute given the complicated and
incomplete data that courts must evaluate to decide physical tie-in
cases.8 4 Such mistakes not only place unfair burdens on the immediate
parties but also reduce firms' incentives to innovates 5
The need for a well-defined legal standard might seem to suggest
the use of a per se rule, since such rules often facilitate judicial ap-
plication" and provide a "brightline" standard by which firms can
judge the legality of their actions.8 7 No simple per se rule, however,
can distinguish physical tie-ins that are socially beneficial from those
that are socially costly.8 Consequently, it is necessary to apply the
81. See p. 785 supra. An overly strict or vague standard, on the other hand, might
induce innovative firms to modify their behavior in order to avoid litigation. Some
firms that would have innovated in the absence of the legal rule might decide not to.
Others might feel compelled to develop only new products that are compatible with
competitors' existing products, which would result in less efficient products or product
systems, or to predisclose technical information concerning their new products to com-
petitors, which would lower their expected return from the new products and hence
reduce their incentives to innovate.
82. Potential plaintiffs will tend to bring suit only if the expected payoff, in terms of
damages received or of improved competitive position, exceeds the significant costs of
bringing the suit. A narrow standard will reduce the probability of a plaintiff's winning,
and hence the expected payoff, in a suit involving a socially beneficial tie-in. See K.
ELZINGA & V. BREiT, THE ANTrrRuSr PENALTIES 76-77, 90-91 (1976).
83. See Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 12, at 240.
84. Id. at 238-39; cf. Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary
Answer to the Prophylactic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MICH. L. REv. 373, 378 (1974)
(arguing that expanding the attempt to monopolize offense by eliminating the requirement
of market power will increase the likelihood of judicial errors in complex cases).
85. See p. 785 supra.
86. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); F. SCHERER, supra
note 24, at 439; Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 12, at 216, 238; cf. Areeda & Turner,
Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 HARV. L. REv. 891, 897 (1976) (criticizing Pro-
fessor Scherer's rule-of-reason approach to predatory pricing as judicially unmanageable).
87. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); Joskow &
Klevorick, supra note 12, at 216, 242. These advantages of a per se rule do not mean that
such a rule is necessarily appropriate for evaluating physical tie-ins, however, for they
may be outweighed by the costs of inaccuracy if the particular rule fails to take account
of important market factors. Cf. Schmalensee, supra note 45, at 1016-31 (arguing that no
single per se rule can accurately judge alleged predatory pricing); Scherer, Predatory
Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARv. L. 11v. 869, 890 (1976) (same).
88. With physical tie-ins, at least three per se rules are possible: (1) physical tie-ins are
per se illegal; or (2) they are per se illegal only when the innovator's market share in both
primary and secondary markets exceeds a specified percentage, but are per se legal if
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"rule of reason" approach of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.89 Utilizing
the foregoing economic analysis and a strong presumption of legalityt'0
the rule of reason can meet the need for a narrow and well-defined
physical tie-in standard.
B. General Principles for Applying the Rule of Reason
Economic analysis suggests two basic principles for weighing the
costs and benefits of a physical tie-in under the rule of reason. First,
because any innovation yields some temporary monopoly gains, and
because these gains constitute a necessary incentive for innovation, such
temporary monopoly gains should be tolerated. 91 Second, because the
either of the innovator's shares are less than the set limits; or (3) they are per se legal.
The weaknesses of these three alternatives are easily seen. The first ignores the benefits
that may result from product innovations and the possible effects such a rule would
have on incentives to innovate. The second, while somewhat better, fails to take into
account, first, that even a firm with a large market share in both markets may not possess
any substantial monopoly power because of the characteristics of the markets, and second,
that the benefits of the tie-in itself may outweigh any costs resulting from increased
market concentration. The last alternative, although it has the advantages of not pro.
hibiting socially beneficial tie-ins and of not adversely affecting incentives, ignores the
possibility that a physical tie-in can be used in a predatory manner to effect a longrun
increase in the innovator's monopoly power. Thus, the costs of inaccuracy of a per se
rule for physical tie-ins are likely to exceed the benefits of simplicity.
89. Although plaintiffs have argued that physical tie-ins are equivalent to traditional
tying arrangements and thus can also violate section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § I
(1976), and section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976), courts have refused to
hold that physical tie-ins are equivalent. See note 5 supra (citing cases). There are several
reasons for continuing to do so. First, for a tying arrangement to violate section I of the
Sherman Act or section 3 of the Clayton Act, there must be a "contract," "agreement," or
"understanding" that the buyer or lessee either purchase or lease a second product from
the vendor or lessor or agree not to purchase, or to lease from any of the vendor's or
lessor's competitors. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 14 (1976); 3 AREMsA & TURNER, suPra note 23, 733
at 257. Physical tie-ins involve no such contract or agreement; a buyer is free to purchase
competitors' existing goods and can purchase competitors' compatible secondary goods as
soon as they are developed. Comment, supra note 1, at 230-31; cf. Automatic Radio Mfg. Co.
v. Ford Motor Co., 242 F. Supp. 852, 857 (D. Mass. 1965); 272 F. Supp. 744 (D. Mass. 1967),
aff'd, 390 F.2d 113 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 914 (1968) (defendant's design changes
did not constitute illegal tying arrangement because involved no contractual limitation).
Second, to the extent that the firm introducing the physical tie-in continues to offer
previous products for sale, competitors have not been excluded from producing com-
plements for the earlier primary products, cf. Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258,
347 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 801 (1975)
(stating, as a ground for dismissing a physical tie-in claim, that the defendant continued
to offer compatible CPU's), and moreover, they are free to offer products compatible with
the new primary product as soon as they can develop and produce them. Finally, because
the law of tying arrangements has so relaxed the requirement of market power in both
the markets for the tying and tied goods, see Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1969); see generally 3 AREEDA & TURNER, sutra note 23,
733 at 257; R. BORK, suPra note 12, at 366-72, it seems inappropriate for the reasons
above, see pp. 780-82 suPra, to judge physical tie-ins by such harsh standards.
90. See p. 795 infra.
91. See pp. 776-77 supra.
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overall benefits of a physical tie-in may outweigh its social costs, long-
run market effects should not be conclusive of a tie-in's illegality. 92
Both principles find considerable, though often implicit, support from
courts and antitrust scholars.
Both Congress and the courts have recognized the importance of
permitting temporary monopolies as an incentive for innovation. Con-
gress, in granting a seventeen-year legal monopoly for patents, 93 be-
lieved that without such a temporary monopoly there would be in-
sufficient incentives for invention.9 4 Similarly, courts have held that
developers of unpatented products have a right to the lead time arising
from being first to market the new goods,95 on the same ground that
the temporary monopoly provides the necessary incentive for such
invention. These policy judgments support the principle that the
temporary effects of physical tie-ins should be ignored.
Furthermore, it is widely recognized that "§ 2 does not prohibit
monopoly simpliciter."90 This basic principle of the Sherman Act is
due in part to the realization that monopoly need not arise only from
exclusionary or predatory acts. Monopoly instead may develop from
natural economies of scale 97 or from the monopolist's "superior skill,
foresight, and industry,"98 which are all socially desirable and there-
fore not condemned. 99 In addition, monopoly is often self-correcting;
in the absence of restrictive practices, competition will eliminate
monopoly power that is not based on greater efficiency.' 00 Thus, courts
generally condemn monopoly only when it is persistent and the result
92. See pp. 783-84 suPra.
93. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976).
94. See W. BOWMAN, supra note 22, at 2-3; F. SCHERER, supra note 24, at 380.
95. See note 75 supra (citing cases).
96. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3517 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (Nos. 79-427, 79-499); see, e.g., United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. I, 62 (1911) (noting "omission [in Sherman Act §§ 1 & 2] of any direct prohibi-
tion against monopoly in the concrete"); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir. 1945). See generally R. BORK, supra note 12, at 57; 16 J. 0. VON
KALINOWSKI, ANTrrRIusT LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 8.02[4] at 8-41 (1974).
97. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945); 3
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 23, 621 at 47-50.
98. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945); cf.
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (monopoly "as a consequence of
a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident," not unlawful); 16 J. 0. VON
KALINOWSKI, supra note 96, § 8.02[4] at 8-63.
99. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
100. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911); 3 AREEDA & TURNER,
supra note 23, 618 at 41-42; cf. R. BORK, supra note 12, at 196-97 (continued existence
of monopoly indicates greater efficiency). But see Williamson, supra note 33, at 1514-22
(arguing that dominance once obtained is unlikely to be eroded).
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of exclusionary acts that in no way benefit consumers.101 This policy
suggests that even physical tie-ins that lead to longrun increases in
market power should not be condemned if they also yield benefits
exceeding these costs of monopoly. 102
Thus it would be consistent with existing antitrust policy and prec-
edents to hold that a physical tie-in is illegal only if (1) the tie-in
appears likely to produce a longrun increase in market power, and (2)
the costs of increased market power exceed the benefits of the tie-in.
C. Guidelines for Applying the Rule of Reason
To implement these principles, specific guidelines are necessary to
guide judicial decisionmaking and to reduce firms' uncertainties. A
two-level test, based on the foregoing economic analysis, would meet
these needs.
At the first level, a court would examine the defendant's market
power in both the primary and secondary markets. If the defendant is
found to lack monopoly power in the primary market, the case would
be dismissed, regardless of the defendant's power in the secondary
market. If the defendant is found to possess such power in the
primary market but not in the secondary market, the case also would
be dismissed, unless the plaintiff could show that the defendant has the
capability of quickly acquiring such power in the secondary market.
Only if the defendant is found to possess substantial monopoly power
in both markets would the court proceed to a second-level, complete
rule of reason analysis.103
101. But see R. BORK, supra note 12, at 170-71 (arguing that courts have condemned
acts by monopolists as exclusionary and violative of Sherman Act § 2 that are in fact
efficiency creating).
102. In apparent support of this principle, Professors Areeda and Turner state:
Our concern about monopoly and the opportunities of rivals must not be allowed to
obscure the objective of antitrust law which seeks to protect the process of competi-
tion on the merits and the economic results associated with workable competition.
Accordingly, non-exploitative pricing, higher output, improved product quality,
energetic market penetration, successful research and development, cost-reducing in-
novations, and the like . . . are not therefore to be considered "exclusionary" for § 2
purposes even if monopoly results .... Antitrust law should not base the imposition
of sanctions on the very conduct it would encourage.
3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 23, 626b at 77-78 (emphasis added). See also R. BORK,
supra note 12, at 107-10 (monopoly should not be condemned if the gains in efficiency
exceed the costs of restricted output).
103. This two-part test finds substantial support, at least implicitly, in the case law.
In United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966), the Supreme Court stated that
"[the offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (I) the pos-
session of monopoly power in the relevant market, and (2) the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a con-
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1. First-Level Analysis
The first-level test is warranted because economic analysis established
that a firm could increase its longrun market power by means of a
physical tie-in only if it already possessed substantial market power in
the primary market, and if it possessed similar power in the secondary
market or the capability of quickly achieving such power in that
market.10 This standard may seem inconsistent with cases holding that
sequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." Accord, Berkey
Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 274 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48
U.S.L.W. 3517 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (Nos. 79-427, 79-499); California Computer Prods.
v. IBM Corp. [1979-1] TRADE CASEs (CCH) 1 62,713 at 77,974 (9th Cir. 1979).
Procedurally, this two-part test could be implemented by bifurcating the trial on
liability, hearing first the question of market power, and then, if necessary, proceeding to
the second-stage inquiry. In this respect, the approach suggested here differs from the
traditional procedure for trying monopolization claims since the question of monopoly
power in both relevant markets is considered separately and prior to a comprehensive ex-
amination of all the facts of the case and of the other elements of the monopolization
offense. Nevertheless, this test offers two important advantages in evaluating physical tie-
ins: it simplifies judicial analysis and conserves judicial resources by avoiding lengthy trials
in cases in which the defendant does not possess the requisite market power, and it provides
a sound method for screening baseless harassment suits. Alternatively, the entire case
could be heard at once, with the judge or jury, by means of special verdicts, deciding the
issues in the appropriate order. This, of course, would eliminate some of the special
advantages of this two-level approach, however.
This suggested approach also resembles that advocated by Professors Joskow and
Klevorick for evaluating predatory pricing claims, see Joskow 9- Klevorick, supra note
12, at 242-62. It appears preferable to the Joskow-Klevorick plan, however, both because
the first level analysis is in many cases considerably simpler than would be required under
the Joskow-Klevorick procedure (for instance, if the defendant possessed a 90% market
share in both primary and secondary markets, it would be unnecessary to consider other
market characteristics at this first-level inquiry, but rather the court could proceed im-
mediately to the full second-level examination), and because it appears to require less of a
departure from existing antitrust precedent.
104. See pp. 780-82 supra. In determining whether a firm possessed sufficient mo-
nopoly power for violation of section 2, courts have relied heavily on the firm's per-
centage share of the relevant market. When a firm possessed a market share equal to or
exceeding 80% of the relevant market, courts have found this alone sufficient to infer
monopoly power. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (87%);
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797 (1946) (80%); United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (90%). Conversely, a relatively
small share of the relevant market has been held conclusive of a lack of monopoly power.
See, e.g., United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 399 (1956) (18%);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 424 (33%); United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Co., 110 F. Supp. 295, 346 (D. Mass. 1953), affl'd per curiam, 347
U.S. 521 (1954) (50%). Between these extremes, market share data has been found in-
conclusive, and courts have considered additional factors such as the characteristics of the
relevant market and the business policies, conduct, and performance of the alleged mo-
nopolist. See 16 J. 0. VoN KALINOWSKY, supra note 96, § 8.02[3] at 8-32 to 8-41. Continued
heavy reliance on market share data appears appropriate in physical tie-in cases, see
pp. 780-81 supra, and in many cases this should be sufficient to make the first-level
determination. When such market share data appear inconclusive, the factors discussed
at pp. 781-82 would be highly relevant.
If the defendant firm is found not to possess monopoly power in the secondary market,
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a firm with monopoly power in one market may be guilty of monopoli-
zation if it leverages such power into a second market, even though
there is little chance of it achieving monopoly power in the second
market.10 5 Traditional leveraging theory has been criticized, however,
because it implies irrational behavior; a monopolist in general can
increase its power in a second market only at the cost of reduced
profits in the market it dominates. 0 6 More important, the leveraging
doctrine generally has been applied only when the defendant's action
is likely to have a longrun exclusionary effect in the secondary mar-
ket;'107 with physical tie-ins, exclusionary effects in the secondary market
will only be temporary unless the defendant is also dominant in that
market and additional conditions hold.'08 Thus, by requiring monopoly
power in both markets as a precondition for any illegality, courts not
only can limit their inquiries to those cases in which there is a pos-
sibility of longrun exclusionary effects, but also can provide a clear
standard for innovators and potential plaintiffs as to which physical
tie-ins are obviously legal.
2. Second-Level Analysis
If a defendant is found to possess the requisite market power to pass
the first-level test, a court would proceed to analyze, in depth, the costs
and benefits of the allegedly predatory physical tie-in. In evaluating
these costs and benefits, a court first should examine the structural
characteristics of the primary and secondary markets in order to deter-
but it is alleged that it has the capability of quickly acquiring such power, the plaintiff
should be required to show that the defendant firm possesses sufficient excess capacity
that could be converted quickly to producing secondary products so that the defendant
could supply a dominant share of that secondary market. See note 61 supra.
105. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958); Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608-09 (1953); United States v.
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107-08 (1948).
106. See R. BORK, supra note 12, at 140-42; R. POSNER, supra note 33, at 173. This
result may not hold, however, in cases in which the products produced by the monop-
olist in the first market may be used in variable proportions with complementary pro-
ducts of the second market to produce a given output or level of satisfaction. In such
cases, a monopolist can increase his profits by imposing some form of restriction, such
as a tying arrangement; this nevertheless may result in an increase in consumer welfare.
See W. BOWMAN, supra note 22, at 84-88.
107. For example, in a tying-arrangement case like International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), a seller could through contract or agreement require a buyer of
product A to continue to purchase all of his requirements of a second product B from
the same seller. Similarly, in United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948), the defendant
motion picture theater chain could pay a higher price in markets in which it possessed
monopsony power in return for lower prices in markets in which it faced competition, in
order to drive out competitors in the latter markets.
108. See pp. 776, 780-82 supra.
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mine the probability that longrun costs will be imposed. 10 9 In addition
to the structural characteristics discussed earlier, various trend data
should be examined. The trend in market shares, both before and
after the introduction of the tie-in, should be considered, especially
with respect to the secondary market. 10 This will help the court de-
termine whether the physical tie-in has significantly increased the de-
fendant's share, and if so, whether this increase has been maintained
or whether it has eroded as competitors developed compatible comple-
ments."' The trend in the number and size of competitors in the
secondary market also should be reviewed, as well as the competitors'
past performance in terms of innovation and imitation.1 12 Finally, the
size and trend of the defendant's profits should be analyzed to deter-
mine the persistence of the profits resulting from the physical tie-in.
The physical tie-in itself should be scrutinized in two ways. First, the
court should consider whether the tie-in constituted a significant in-
novation 1 3 or whether it was simply a redesign of existing products.
Second, it is relevant whether the physical tie-in represents an addition
to the defendant's line of products or is a replacement for previous
products."14 When possible, however, the court should refrain from
second-guessing the defendant's engineering decisions through con-
109. The market characteristics, discussed previously, determine not only the prob-
ability that longrun market concentration could occur, but also the likelihood that a
firm would be induced to attempt to increase its market power (since these factors affect
the size of the expected monopoly profits) and the expected social costs resulting from
any increase in longrun market power. See note 58 supra.
110. See 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 23, 804 at 292; Schmalensee, supra note 45,
at 1030; cf. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 596 (1957)
(anti-competitive effect of du Pont's acquisition between 1917 and 1919 of 23% of Gen.
eral Motors stock, considered in light of 1946-1947 market share data).
It is arguable that market-share trends should be considered in the first-level analysis.
Including such information at this early stage would have the advantages of increasing
the accuracy of the first-level inquiry, and, in cases in which the temporary increase in
the defendant's market share was shortlived, of making the second-level inquiry un-
necessary. Nevertheless, it is recommended that trends in market shares be considered in
the second-level analysis for two reasons: first, inclusion of such data would necessarily
complicate the first-level analysis, yet it is unclear how frequently such added information
would eliminate the need for the second-level inquiry; and, second, explanation and
understanding of data on market share trends may often be possible only in light of
other information that would be offered only at the complete second-level inquiry.
111. See p. 776 supra.
112. See p. 782 supra.
113. See p. 783 supra.
114. If the tie-in represents only an addition to the defendant's line of products and
the defendant continues to produce his previous primary products, the costs to competi-
tors, for instance, in the form of obsolete inventories, would be reduced. A new product
supplanting a previous product should not be conclusive of predation, however, since the
new product may represent a general improvement over the old. Some evidence of such
improvements, however, should be required.
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sideration of possible alternative designs. To do otherwise not only
would enmesh the courts in technical inquiries beyond their compe-
tence, but also would impose an excessive burden on firms to consider
numerous alternative designs in order to weigh their possible adverse
effect on competitors." 5
The defendant's intent and conduct are also significant. 116 Some
inference of intent may be gleaned from the timing of the announce-
ment of the new products and of the actual introduction of those
products into the market."17 In addition, the defendant's pricing
strategy for the new primary and secondary products may be important.
To the extent the defendant prices his secondary product in a preda-
tory manner, competitors will have more difficulty in developing com-
patible secondary products and in selling them at a price that will
yield an adequate return. Unusually low pricing also may be relevant
in determining the defendant's intent."" Finally, the previous record
of innovations in the relevant markets should be considered to de-
termine whether the defendant firm generally has been a leader in
innovation or whether it has tended to copy competitors' innovations.
Evidence that the defendant has been a consistent innovator should
115. See Response of Carolina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307, 1330 (5th
Cir. 1976); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 440-41 (N.D.
Cal. 1978); Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258, 347 (N.D. Okla. 1973), rev'd, 510
F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
There is one possible exception to the above rule. When it is clear that one of the new
products could have been made compatible with existing complementary products as well
as the new complementary product at little or no increase in cost, it is reasonable to
inquire into the defendant's reasons and justifications for restricting the compatibility of
the new product. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 288-89
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3517 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (Nos. 79-427, 79-499)
(for 18 months, Kodak restricted new Kodacolor II color print film to 110 film format).
This should not be conclusive of illegality, however, as there may be justifiable reasons
for initially restricting the product (e.g., Kodak justified its initial restriction of Koda-
color II film to the 110 format on the grounds that it wanted to restrict distribution of
the new film "until the defects . . . were eliminated," and chose the 110 format because
"the advantages of the new film were most useful for small cameras." 603 F.2d at 288
n. 42.)
116. Although the monopolization offense of section 2 requires no showing of a
specific intent to monopolize, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,
432 (2d Cir. 1945); accord, United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948), evidence of
intent nevertheless may be relevant in determining the legality of a particular course of
conduct, Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); accord, United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13 (1978); Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 288 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3517 (U.S.
Feb. 19, 1980) (Nos. 79-427, 79-499). See generally 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 23,
626a at 73-76.
117. See note 52 supra.
118. Because lower prices on the physical tie-in sometimes will be simply a necessary
response by the innovator to the lower prices or new products of competitors, it appears
reasonable to apply the usual tests for predatory pricing to the new products. See gen-
erally Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 12.
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weigh in favor of the legality of the physical tie-in. 119
These guidelines for applying the rule of reason are intended to
allow a defendant ample opportunity to justify the tie-in. Neverthe-
less, because this weighing of costs and benefits necessarily involves
rough estimates and because of the concern that the legal rule not
inhibit innovation, this rule should be combined with a strong pre-
sumption of legality. 120 Thus, unless the costs clearly outweigh the
benefits, the tie-in should be held lawful.
III. Berkey Photo: A Tentative Step in the Right Direction
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 1 2 1 is the leading case on
physical tie-ins. It is the first case in which a physical tie-in was found
at trial to violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act, and the only case in
which a district court and an appellate court extensively analyzed the
problem. The Berkey opinion by the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit is the most comprehensive and insightful discussion of the
problem to date. Nevertheless, the court avoided extensive analysis of
some issues by deciding them on narrow grounds, gave ambiguous
answers to others, and committed one serious policy error. Applying
the analysis advanced in this Note to the facts of the Berkey case
illuminates both the failings in the Berkey court's reasoning and the
value of the proposed approach.
A. The Facts of Berkey 22
In 1972 Kodak introduced the 110 camera system, consisting of the
new 110 pocket instamatic camera and a new and smaller film format
119. When imitation costs are low and innovation costs are high, it may be more
profitable for a firm to adopt a strategy of imitation rather than innovation. In such
situations, the rate of innovation in the market will be determined by the few firms that
continue to invest in research and development and to attempt to innovate. Schumpeterian
Trade-Off, supra note 15, at 39-40. It would be counterproductive in such cases to attack
those few firms pursuing the less profitable, but socially more beneficial, innovation
strategy. In other market situations, one firm consistently may be an innovation leader,
either because of economies of scale in research and development, see R. NELSON, M.
PECK, & E. KALACHEK, TECHNOLOGY, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC POLICY 68 (1969), or
because of natural trajectories in the development of the relevant technology, see note 65
supra. Again, it would be undesirable to hinder the innovation leader.
120. Cf. Schmalensee, supra note 45, at 1031 (courts deciding predatory pricing cases
should combine use of the rule of reason with strong presumption of legality in order
to avoid condemning or stifling desirable competitive pricing).
121. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)
(opinion on defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. and plaintiff's application for equitable
relief), rev'd and remanded, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3517
(U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (Nos. 79-427, 79-499).
122. The following summary of the facts is not intended to be complete. Other viola-
tions of the Sherman Act were alleged at trial but will not be discussed here because they
are not relevant to the issue of physical tie-ins.
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compatible with the new camera. 123 At the same time, Kodak intro-
duced a new color print film, Kodacolor II, which was the only color
print film available for use in the 110 camera and which, for eighteen
months, was available only in the 110 format.12 4 The introduction of
the new camera, new film format, and new color print film constituted
the first physical tie-in of the Berkey case.125
The new Kodacolor II film required a new photofinishing process
using different equipment and chemicals. Consequently, photofinishers
competing with Kodak's photofinishing division were unable to process
the Kodacolor II film until they had purchased new equipment and
received instruction in and supplies for the new process, which for
some time were only offered by Kodak.126 Sales of the equipment and
chemicals thus could be viewed as being physically tied to the sale of
Kodacolor II film. This was the second tie-in of the Berkey case.
Berkey Photo, one of Kodak's competitors in the manufacture and
sale of cameras and in photofinishing, alleged that Kodak had used these
two physical tie-ins to monopolize all four relevant markets.
B. The Second Circuit Opinion
Writing for the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Chief
Judge Kaufman considered sequentially each of the four relevant
markets and the associated allegations of monopolization and attempted
monopolization.
Berkey made three separate, though related, arguments supporting
its claim that Kodak used the first. tie-in to monopolize the camera
market.127 Berkey's first claim, focusing on the introduction of the new
camera and new film format, asserted that Kodak had breached a duty
to predisclose its new film format to competitors so that they could
have compatible cameras on the market in time for the new format's
123. 603 F.2d at 279-81.
124. Id. at 276-78. Kodak stated at trial and on appeal that it had developed the new
film out of a concern that existing color films were too "grainy" to provide acceptable
prints from such small negatives. Id. at 277. Kodak's justification for initially restricting
the new film to the 110 format was that the film involved a "radically new technology,"
and that consequently Kodak wanted "to introduce it on a limited scale in order to test
its technical performance before attempting to substitute it for Kodacolor X, Kodak's
largest selling film." Brief for Eastman Kodak at 30.
125. Although the introduction of the three new products made up but one physical
tie-in, plaintiff Berkey developed separate arguments challenging the legality of the new
camera and new film format on the one hand, and of the new camera and new film on
the other.
126. 603 F.2d at 290-91.
127. Id. at 279.
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actual introduction. 128 The Second Circuit dismissed this argument
and held that as a matter of law, Kodak had no duty of predisclosure. 29
In so holding, the court reaffirmed the right of innovators to enjoy
their temporary monopoly profits13 0 and relieved dominant firms of
the uncertainty they would have faced with a contrary ruling. The
court failed, however, to discuss the separate argument that Kodak,
even though it had no duty to predisclose the new camera and format,
might nevertheless have violated Section 2 because of the exclusionary
effect of the system's introduction on competitors. 131 The court thus left
unanswered the basic question of whether, and under what conditions,
a physical tie-in might violate the antitrust laws.
Berkey's second and third arguments related to Kodak's simultaneous
introduction of the 110 camera and Kodacolor II film, which, Berkey
claimed, permitted Kodak to leverage its monopoly power in the film
market into the damera market. With respect to its second argument,
Berkey asserted that the success of the 110 camera was in large part
due to its being marketed with the new Kodacolor II film, and con-
tended that "because Kodacolor II was not necessary to produce satis-
factory 110 photographs and in fact suffered from several deficiencies,
these gains were unlawful."'132 The court dismissed this claim as well.
128. Berkey contended that Kodak forfeited its right to profit from any camera-format
innovations without predisclosure, because Kodak, with a monopoly in the film, had
refused to make film available for formats other than those for which it made compatible
cameras, thereby preventing other camera manufacturers from introducing cameras in
new formats. Id.
129. Id. at 285. Requiring predisclosure of all technical information, the court noted,
would stifle innovation, while requiring limited predisclosure would give firms too little
guidance as to what must be disclosed. Id. at 281-82. In addition, the court found the
alleged duty of predisclosure without precedent; therefore, "it would be inappropriate
to hold that Kodak should spontaneously have recognized a duty to release advance in-
formation of its new products to its competitors." Id. at 285. Finally, noting that a firm
with a much smaller share of the film market also could have introduced the new
camera and new format, Judge Kaufman concluded that "the ability to introduce the
new format without predisclosure was solely a benefit of integration and not, without
more, a use of Kodak's power in the film market." Id. at 283. This last passage is
ambiguous, for it might be interpreted as saying that physical tie-ins are per se legal, or,
more narrowly, that physical tie-ins that are merely additions to the innovator's line of
products are per se legal.
130. Id. at 283 (citing ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423,
437 (N.D. Cal. 1978) for proposition that depriving an innovating firm of its lead time
would remove its incentive to invent).
131. This argument, along with the additional argument that Kodak had excluded
competing camera manufacturers by refusing to market film in formats compatible with
their cameras, had been made by Berkey's counsel both in brief, Post-Argument Brief for
Berkey Photo, Inc., at 3-6, and at oral argument, Transcript at 69-73. The Second Circuit
only addressed the latter argument, which it dismissed on the ground that Berkey had
not sued Kodak for its refusal to sell film. Id. at 284.
132. Id. at 286. Berkey apparently emphasized the deficiencies of Kodacolor II in
order, first, to show that the new product introduction was "primarily exclusionary and
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Judge Kaufman observed that, although the earlier film, Kodacolor X,
may have proved adequate in the 110 format, it was wrong to fault
Kodak for attempting to design a superior product.133 Furthermore,
Judge Kaufman stated that whether a judge or jury finds a product
inferior is irrelevant, so long as market success was not coerced.
134
Finally, Berkey argued, somewhat contradictorily, that by restricting
Kodacolor II to the 110 film format for eighteen months, Kodak forced
those wishing to use "the remarkable new film" to buy a Kodak 110
camera. 135 The court avoided full consideration of this issue by dis-
missing the claim on the narrow ground that Berkey had failed to
prove any damages because it had offered no evidence that customers
had in fact bought a 110 camera in order to use the new Kodacolor II
film. 3 6
anticompetitive" and not "a form of honestly industrial competition, designed to produce
something more attractive for the customer," see Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 457 F. Supp. 404, 416 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd and remanded, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3517 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (Nos. 79-427, 79-499), and second,
to avoid the holding of United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966), that a
monopolist's acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power by means of a "superior
product" is lawful, id. at 570-71.
133. 603 F.2d at 286.
134. Id. at 287. In addition, the court stated that the question of product quality has
little meaning, since a "product that commends itself to many users because superior in
certain respects may be rendered unsatisfactory to others by flaws they consider fatal."
Id. at 286-87.
Although the court is correct in recognizing the difficulties inherent in any judicial
analysis of product quality and in stressing the importance of market acceptance in the
evaluation of product quality, a judge or jury must nevertheless make an independent
inquiry into the question of quality in two important instances. First, in evaluating the
benefits conferred by a physical tie-in, whether the tie-in merely supplements or replaces
the existing product line is important. When a new product pair merely supplements or
expands upon an existing product line, the choice offered consumers has been increased.
If this product pair proves successful, it must better satisfy at least some consumers' wants
than do existing products. In this case, market acceptance should be given great weight.
When a new product supplants one or more existing products, however, it becomes im-
possible to compare the quality of the products in terms of consumer demand. Since
consumers do not have a choice among all the possible alternatives, they easily could
have preferred the product pair that was replaced. See generally Allocation and Distribu-
tion Theory, supra note 27. A new product supplanting existing products should not
iPso facto be held illegal, however, since it may be better in many or all respects than
the earlier products it replaced. Such a determination, however, should be made by the
finder of fact who considers the physical attributes and prices of the products involved.
A second instance in which a judge or jury should consider the question of product
quality occurs when it has been alleged that the primary product has been unnecessarily
restricted so as to be compatible only with the new secondary product, in order that the
innovator's monopoly power in the primary market can be transferred to the new seg-
ment of the secondary market. In this case, the tie-in should be held to be a form of
illegal leveraging only if the new primary product is in fact superior to existing primary
products and if there exists no reasonable justification for the restriction in compatibility.
See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 288-89 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3517 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980) (Nos. 79-427, 79-499).
135. 603 F.2d at 288.
136. Id.
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Berkey further alleged that Kodak illegally had bolstered its monop-
oly in the film market through various exclusionary means, including
its introduction of the 110 camera system, the first tie-in. 137 The
Second Circuit remanded this claim for retrial on other grounds, 13
without explaining how the same film and camera tie-in could be
illegal in the film market after the court had already held it legal in
the camera market. 39 Moreover, the court failed to provide any guid-
ance as to how the legality of this particular tie-in should be determined
on retrial.
Finally, with respect to the markets for photofinishing equipment
and services, Berkey sought damages for lost photofinishing profits and
for overcharges by Kodak on photofinishing equipment, apparently on
the theory that Kodak had unlawfully used its film-photofinishing tie-
in in transferring its monopoly power in the film and camera markets
to secure an unfair advantage over its photofinishing competitors. 140
The Second Circuit held that it was unclear whether these effects were
attributable to Kodak's innovation or to its monopoly power, and
reversed and remanded the claim for retrial.' 41
The Second Circuit's Berkey opinion contributes several important
insights to the physical tie-in issue, including its holding that even
monopolists have no duty to predisclose technical information con-
cerning product innovations to competitors, and its emphasis on the
importance of the innovator's lead time as an incentive for innovation.
The court failed, however, to answer the most important question:
under what conditions can physical tie-ins violate the antitrust laws?
The opinion at one point seems to suggest that they are per se legal,' 42
yet at other times suggests that liability could be found. 4 3 Further-
more, under the rule of reason principles advanced in this Note, the
Berkey court committed a serious error in remanding, rather than
dismissing, the claim that Kodak used its film-photofinishing tie-in to
bolster its position in the photofinishing market. The court found
that "Kodak did not monopolize or attempt to monopolize the photo-
137. Id. at 293.
138. Id. at 298-99.
139. Under the analysis of this Note, see pp. 771-84 supra, it is of course possible for
a physical tie-in to have permanent exclusionary and unlawful effects in one market and
not in the second. But, if the Second Circuit is saying that the camera, film, and film
format tie-ins are per se legal with respect to the camera market, see note 129 supra, it
would appear inconsistent to hold that it is potentially illegal with respect to the film
market.
140. 603 F.2d at 290-91.
141. Id. at 291-92.
142. See note 129 supra.
143. See 603 F.2d at 290-91.
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finishing or equipment markets,"'144 and thus should have dismissed
the claim.
C. Hypothetical Application of the Guidelines to the Berkey Facts
The facts contained in the Second Circuit's Berkey opinion are in-
sufficient for a complete application of the guidelines advanced in this
Note. It is possible, though, if the plaintiff's failures of proof and the
actual disposition of the claims are ignored, to use the Berkey case to
show generally how the guidelines might be applied by a judge or jury.
Consider first the introduction of the 110 camera system, the first
physical tie-in. Berkey alleged that Kodak had illegally used this first
tie-in to bolster its monopoly power in both the film and camera
markets. Since the jury at trial found Kodak to possess monopoly power
in both the camera and film markets,'4 5 this first tie-in would pass the
first-stage inquiry. At the second stage, it would be necessary to con-
sider the likelihood that Kodak could increase its longrun market power
in either the camera or film markets by means of this first tie-in, and
then to weigh this expected cost against the benefits of the new pro-
ducts. In evaluating the expected social costs of Kodak's increased
market power, it would be particularly important to examine whether
any persistent increase in Kodak's share of the film and camera markets
results from the introduction of the 110 system, though the other factors
discussed previously also should be considered.146 In measuring bene-
fits, the rapid and large growth in sales of 110 cameras and film sug-
gests that, as the Second Circuit observed, consumers believed the 110
system had significant advantages over existing cameras and formats. 147
This strong consumer acceptance of new products that merely supple-
mented Kodak's existing product line should weigh heavily in favor of
the legality of the camera-format introduction with respect to both the
camera and film markets.
The legality of Kodak's initial restriction of its new Kodacolor II
film to the 110 format and hence to the 110 camera is more doubtful.
Berkey alleged that Kodak imposed this restriction solely for the pur-
pose of leveraging its monopoly power in the film market into the
144. 603 F.2d at 291. In addition, the court had earlier noted that in 1970 Kodak's
photofinishing division had held only 17% of the market. Id. at 271.
145. 603 F.2d at 279, 293.
146. With regard to the camera market, Kodak's subsequent and precipitous decline
in market share in 1976, see id. at 273 n.11, should weigh heavily against its alleged
monopolization of the camera market.
147. Id. at 286-87.
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camera market.148 Since this restriction involved the camera and film
markets, both of which Kodak dominated, the court would have to
proceed to a complete second-level evaluation. At the second-stage in-
quiry, possible longrun exclusionary effects would again be con-
sidered in estimating potential social costs. In examining the benefits
of the tie-in, however, the examination would focus not on the ad-
vantages of Kodacolor II, but rather on Kodak's justifications for
restricting the new film to the 110 format when it could easily have
cut it to fit other formats as well. This restriction of Kodacolor II to
the 110 format should not be held unlawful, however, if any of the
following facts were shown: that no persistent increase in Kodak's
power in the camera market resulted, 149 that the new Kodacolor II
film did not offer any advantages over existing Kodacolor X that would
increase the demand for Kodak's 110 cameras, or that Kodak had
socially justifiable reasons for the restriction.""
Berkey also claimed that the new equipment and chemicals required
for processing Kodacolor II constituted a second unlawful physical
tie-in. This claim would not pass the first-level test, since the jury at
trial found that Kodak did not possess monopoly power in either the
photofinishing or photofinishing equipment markets,'51 and, therefore,
the claim should be dismissed.
Conclusion
Physical tie-ins may be used in a predatory manner to increase an
innovator's longrun market power in one or more markets, and, as a
result, they should be subject to the scrutiny of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act. Nevertheless, because physical tie-ins can benefit con-
sumers and can have longrun adverse effects on market structure only
under limited conditions, and because overly strict regulation may ad-
versely affect the incentive to innovate, a narrow and well-defined legal
standard is required. This Note provides such a standard, something
the Second Circuit failed to do. The guidelines recommended here
for applying the rule of reason would focus not on the possible
temporary effects on competition, but rather on the weighing of the
benefits of the tie-in against any probable longrun anticompetitive
effects.
148. Id. at 288-89.
149. See note 146 supra.
150. See note 134 supra.
151. 603 F.2d at 275, 291.
